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Abstract Cost cap tariffs are pay-per-use tariffs for which costs cannot exceed a
predefined cost limit. They were recently introduced to telecommunications mar-
kets, but were previously also applied in the insurance industry as deductibles or in
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consumer surplus model that explains the optimal consumption pattern under cost
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per-use and flat rate tariffs by a rational consumer. We find that cost cap tariffs are
an optimal tariff choice only if the level of uncertainty is sufficiently high. Our
theoretical predictions are supported by survey data.
Keywords Tariff choice  Consumer surplus model  Cost cap tariff 
Pay-per-use tariff  Flat rate tariff  Tariff bias  Service industries 
Telecommunications  Tariff bias
JEL Classification D11  D12  M31
Responsible editor: So¨nke Albers (Marketing).
P. Ko¨hler  L. Kru¨ger
Institute of Information Systems and Marketing, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology,





Chair of Information Systems with a focus in Internet Business, University of Passau,
Innstr. 43, 94032 Passau, Germany
e-mail: jan.kraemer@uni-passau.de
123
Business Research (2014) 7:161–190
DOI 10.1007/s40685-014-0007-7
1 Introduction
A cost cap tariff is a two-part tariff that is a hybrid between a pure pay-per-use tariff
(where costs accrue with usage) and a flat rate (where costs are independent of
usage). The cost cap tariff is a pure pay-per-use tariff until the costs reach an upper
limit. At this cost level, the tariff effectively becomes a flat rate because any further
consumption is not charged to the consumer. Thus, the consumer might pay less, but
never more than this upper limit.
Cost cap tariffs were first introduced in addition to existing pay-per-use plans and
flat rates in the German mobile communications market in 2009. Provider O2/
Telefonica introduced this new tariff type for voice communication in 2009 with a
price of 0.15 €/min and a monthly cost cap of 60 €. At the time, this pricing was
such that the minute price of the cost cap tariff exceeded the common market price
for pure pay-per-use tariffs (0.09 €/min) while the cost cap was set at the level of
comparable flat rate plans. The introduction of the cost cap tariff led to a clear
increase in customers for O2 (Briegleb 2009). As a consequence, several
competitive virtual mobile network operators soon followed with similar offers.
While these mobile network operators are still offering cost cap tariffs, the initial
provider O2 decided to no longer advertise its cost cap tariff. Thus, the long run
effects on consumer choice and providers’ profits are an open research question.
Furthermore, the use of cost cap tariffs is not limited to the telecommunications
market. Insurance services often include deductibles which behave in the same
fashion as a cost ceiling of consumer payment. Also rental services, e.g., for car or
bike sharing, often include a time-dependent rate which is covered by predefined
day rates. Table 1 illustrates some selective examples for different industries.
Thereby, note that cost cap tariffs are offered both by the same company in addition
to its pay-per-use and flat rate tariffs as well as in response to flat rate and/or pay-
per-use tariffs by competitors.
However, from a theoretical perspective, the relationship between the pricing and
the demand of cost cap tariffs, particularly in the presence of other tariffs, has not
yet been investigated.
In this article, a simple model of consumer surplus is developed that seeks to
explain consumers’ rationale in choosing a cost cap tariff over pay-per-use plans
and flat rates. We focus on the realistic case where the marginal price of the cost cap
tariff is not smaller than the marginal price of the pay-per-use tariff and where the
cost cap level is at or above the price level of the flat rate. Otherwise, the cost cap
tariff would clearly dominate both the pay-per-use plan and the flat rate. Moreover,
to disentangle the pure pricing effect of tariffs from other effects that may influence
a consumers tariff choice, such as tariff biases or brand effects, we assume that
consumers base their consumption decision solely on prices and their (uncertain)
preference for the service offered.
We find that cost cap tariffs should never be chosen over pay-per-use or flat rate
plans if consumers are certain about their preferences and consequently in their
demand. In this case, the cost cap tariff is always dominated by either the pay-per-
use plan or the flat rate. However, if consumers have uncertainty in their
preferences, the cost cap tariff may generate a higher (expected) consumer surplus
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than a pay-per-use plan or a flat rate. This holds true even though consumers are
charged more at the margin than in a pay-per-use tariff and the maximum possible
bill amount is higher under a cost cap compared to a flat rate tariff. This is because
the cost cap tariff does not only provide cost insurance in case of high demand (like
a flat rate), but also cost flexibility in case of low demand (like a pay-per-use tariff).
The main research questions that are addressed are (1) under which conditions are
cost cap tariffs potentially chosen (over pay-per-use plans and flat rates)? and (2)
what is the impact of demand uncertainty on tariff choice?
Finally, our theoretical predictions are compared to empirical data that was
collected in a survey among a representative sample of German mobile telephony
customers. We find a good model fit, both with respect to the predictions for
expected telephony usage and for expected consumer surplus under a given tariff.
However, we also find a systematic tariff bias, which is in line with previous
research.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Next, Sect. 2 discusses the
related literature on tariff research. Thereafter, Sect. 3 presents the consumer surplus
Table 1 Exemplary tariff structures in different industries (September 2013)
Pay-per-use Cost cap Flat rate
Telecommunications
Tariff O2 Loop O2o O2 Blue All-in
Minute price p 0.09 €/min 0.15 €/min
Cost cap c 50 €/month
Fixed fee f 39.99 €/month
Tariff n-tv go simyo 9 Cent Tariff klarmobil Allnet-Flat
Minute price p 0.06 €/min 0.09 €/min
Cost cap c 39 €/month
Fixed fee f 24.85 €/month
Car rental
Tariff Drive Now car2go Enterprise
Hour price p 0.31 €/min 14.90 €/h
Day rate c 59 €/day
Fixed fee f 49 €/day
Bike rental
Tariff DB Call a Bike DB Rental Station
Hour price p 0.08 €/h
Day rate c 15 €/day
Fixed fee f 12.70 €/day
Fitness studio
Tariff flexifit Vienna euroGym Vienna
Hour price p 0.10 €/min
Day rate c 15 €/day
Fixed fee f 14 €/day
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model and the results on customer choice in the case where the customer has
certainty about his preferences. Section 4 considers the optimal consumption pattern
under cost tariffs when consumers have uncertainty about their preferences.
Subsequently, the conditions under which it is optimal to choose cost cap tariffs
over pay-per-use and flat rate plans are developed in Sect. 5. Finally, in Sect. 6, the
consumer surplus model is evaluated empirically.
2 Related literature
Research on nonlinear pricing is rooted in welfare economics (Leland and Meyer
1976; Murphy 1977) and has been mainly studied from an analytical perspective
(Essegaier et al. 2002; Hayes 1987; Oi 1971; Sundararajan 2004). Yet, there has
been an increase in empirical research (Danaher 2002; Schulze et al. 2005; Iyengar
et al. 2008; Lambrecht et al. 2007; Schlereth and Skiera 2012) within the last
decade. An important aspect of modeling of consumer behavior under different
tariffs is the literature on discrete/continuous choice models (Dubin and McFadden
1984; Hanemann 1984). These models assume that a discrete choice is made
simultaneously with a continuous choice. Applied to the case of tariffs, the discrete
choice of a tariff depends on the choice of continuous consumption and vice versa.
Hausmann (1985) and Moffitt (1986) lay the groundwork for the application of
these models on multi-part tariffs. The consumer’s calculus in these situations
consists of two steps. First, the consumer surplus optimizing consumption on each
tariff segment (e.g., the pay-per-use or flat rate segment) is calculated, then the
segment which maximizes the overall consumer surplus is chosen, subject to the
associated optimal consumption decision and the corresponding bill amount. In this
context, note that the composition of a tariff with several tariff components, such as
minute prices, allowances or cost caps, induces a nonlinearity in the consumer’s cost
function. However, the tariff can be subdivided into linear tariff segments. For
example, a cost cap tariff consists of a linear pay-per-use segment (i.e., from zero
consumption until the cost cap is reached) and a linear flat rate segment (i.e., any
consumption beyond the cost cap). These models have been extended in several
ways, e.g., by incorporating uncertainty in consumption (Lambrecht et al. 2007) or
attrition probabilities (Danaher 2002) (Table 2).
Most of the earlier literature which applied analytical tariff modeling focused on
the impact of transaction costs (Sundararajan 2004) or capacity constraints
(Essegaier et al. 2002) on a provider’s profit. Thereby, consumers’ tariff choice
and consumption decision were addressed with rather simple consumer surplus
models. In contrast, empirical research applied more sophisticated models (e.g.,
Albers and Skiera 2006) to explain observed tariff choice including certain
irrationalities, such as tariff biases (Schulze et al. 2005) or brand effects (Iyengar
and Jedidi 2012).
The papers that are most related to ours, but do not address the cost cap tariff, are
Lambrecht et al. (2007) and Iyengar et al. (2008). More specifically, Lambrecht
et al. (2007) develop an empirical model for uncertainty under three-part tariffs
(consisting of a fixed fee, a usage allowance, and pay-per-use price for the usage
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that exceeds the allowance) by incorporating future usage shocks occurring prior to
the consumption decision in the tariff choice stage. Within their model, uncertainty
is a key driver for three-part tariff choice. Iyengar et al. (2008) derive the optimal
consumption level for three-part tariffs under certainty first, and then allow for small
variations of this level ex post. Thereby, both papers propose a similar consumer
surplus model with the intention in mind to explain observed tariff choice by
estimating the models’ underlying parameters. Schlereth and Skiera (2012)
demonstrated that such models can be also used to predict tariff choice of
innovative tariffs. The predictions of these models are, therefore, the result of a
choice model that has been calibrated by actual tariff decisions, including
consumers’ biases and irrationalities.
In contrast to the stated literature, we derive a consumer surplus model with the
intention to explain the theoretically optimal tariff choice. Within this model, tariff
choice relies on the preferences of a representative consumer, and not on an
exogenous demand or observed choice. This modeling approach has the distinct
advantage that the demand for tariff usage is derived endogenously and depends
also on the chosen tariff and the pricing structure. In other words, given the same
preferences, a consumer will exert a different consumption pattern under a cost cap
tariff than under a pay-per-use or flat rate plan, because prices are different. This
endogenous change in demand should be taken into account when choosing a tariff.
Thereby, we assume that consumers have uncertainty about their preferences ex
ante (Kridel et al. 1993). This assumption is driven by the belief that consumers are
uncertain about the realization of their preferences during the runtime of their
contract when choosing a tariff, e.g., due to unforseen changes in their habits. Thus,
uncertainty in consumption is driven by the uncertainty in preferences and not by
external shocks as similarly stated by Hayes (1987). Consequently, the optimal
Table 2 Related literature on tariff choice modeling
References Approach Tariff structures Uncertainty
Analytical Empirical PU FR CC 2PT 3PT
Oi (1971)    
Hayes (1987)   
Danaher (2002)   
Essegaier et al. (2002)    
Sundararajan (2004)   
Schulze et al. (2005)    
Albers and Skiera (2006)  
Lambrecht et al. (2007)   
Iyengar et al. (2008)   
Schlereth and Skiera (2012)  
This research     
Tariff structures: Pay-per-use (PU), flat rate (FR), cost cap (CC), two-part (2PT), three-part
(3PT)
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consumption is uncertain as well. Therefore, even small levels of uncertainty do not
simply imply kinks in the demand function as in Iyengar, Jedidi, and Kohli; instead,
they may cause actual discontinuities in the demand functions (cf. Moffitt 1986,
p. 320), because demand is shifted to a different tariff segment. In contrast to
external shocks, these discontinuities in the demand function are tariff dependent.
Moreover, for the most part the present paper abstracts from any bias or other
irrationality in tariff choice. Instead, a fully rational consumer is assumed, who may,
however, face uncertainty about his preferences (demand). Since we abstract from
any bias (or irrationality), we can provide insights under which condition a cost cap
tariff should be chosen, even though it offers a higher variable rate than the
concurrently offered pay-per-use tariff and a higher cost ceiling than the
concurrently offered flat rate tariff.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, with the exception of Kra¨mer and Wiewiorra
(2012), cost cap tariffs have not received academic attention before. Kra¨mer and
Wiewiorra conduct an empirical investigation of the flexibility effect in tariff choice
in which they also consider the cost cap tariff. They highlight that there might exist
a ‘‘cost cap bias’’, by which customers favor cost caps over pay-per-use tariffs and
flat rates even if the tariffs yield the same economic costs. In our empirical analysis,
we can confirm such a cost cap bias, which exists over and beyond the rational
choice of cost cap tariffs.
3 Tariff choice and consumption under certainty
In the following, we focus on the choice between a pay-per-use (PU), flat rate (FR)
and cost cap (CC) tariff from the point of view of a single, representative consumer.
Any feasible tariff under one of these three tariff types can be described by the tuple
t ¼ ðb; p; cÞ; ð1Þ
where b denotes a fixed base fee which must be paid independent of the con-
sumption, p is a constant price for each consumption unit and c stands for a cost cap,
i.e., an upper threshold for the total billing amount. More specifically, for the PU
tariff, it holds that
tPU ¼ ð0; pPU;1Þ: ð2Þ
The FR tariff is characterized by
tFR ¼ ðbFR; 0;1Þ: ð3Þ
And for the CC tariff, it holds that
tCC ¼ ð0; pCC; cCCÞ: ð4Þ
Depending on the tariff and given the consumption level n 0; a customer has
total costs of
ktðnÞ ¼
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Like Iyengar et al. (2008), Lambrecht et al. (2007) and Schlereth and Skiera (2012),
we assume a quadratic functional form for the consumer’s surplus function as
follows
utðnÞ ¼ b1n  b2n2  ktðnÞ; ð6Þ
where b1; b2 [ 0 are the individual preference parameters that express the con-
sumer’s gross surplus of consumption relative to the monetary units k: Notice that
the consumer surplus function is quasi-concave and thus it implies that optimal
consumption is bound, even at zero marginal costs (Hausmann 1985). However, our
results are not limited to this specification and should hold for any quasi-concave
consumer surplus function. An alternative modeling approach includes for instance
the modified exponential function, as discussed in Albers and Skiera (2006).
More explicitly, for the three tariffs considered here, a consumer’s surplus can be
written as follows:
uPUðnÞ ¼ b1n  b2n2  npPU ð7Þ
uFRðnÞ ¼ b1n  b2n2  bFR ð8Þ
uCCðnÞ ¼ b1n  b2n
2  npCC if npCC  cCC
b1n  b2n2  cCC otherwise:

ð9Þ
As noted above, we restrict our analysis to the interesting case where all
parameters are non-negative and cCC [ bFR and pCC [ pPU: Moreover, we assume
that b1 [ pCC; which ensures that the optimal consumption levels under all tariffs
are positive.
In a deterministic setting, where the consumer has no uncertainty about his
preferences b; it is straightforward to show (by maximizing (7) and (8) with respect
to n; respectively; see also Iyengar et al. 2008) that the optimal consumption levels








respectively. The solutions are unique because the consumer surplus function is
quasi concave and the corresponding cost function (5) is linear (see Hausmann
1985, p. 1257). The consumer surplus that is derived from these optimal con-
sumption plans is given by substituting (10) back into (7) and (8), respectively:
uPUðnPUÞ ¼






A consumer is thus indifferent between a PU and an FR tariff if and only if
uPUðnPUÞ ¼ uFRðnFRÞ: Solving this equation for the preference parameter b1 yields:
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b1 ¼ 2b2 bFRpPU þ
pPU
2
: Thus, for every b1\b

1; the consumer prefers the PU tariff over
the FR tariff and vice versa.
The derivation of the optimal consumption under a CC tariff is more complex
because the cost function is concave here. In general, there will thus exist an optimal
consumption level for each tariff segment (i.e., before and after reaching the cost
cap) of the CC tariff. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the consumer surplus
maximizing consumption on each tariff segment before one can then choose the
segment that generates the higher overall consumer surplus (cf. Hausmann 1985,
p. 1256). In other words, first we derive the optimal consumption under a CC tariff
under the expectation that the cost cap is not met (i.e., for the PU segment),
constrained on the condition that the optimal consumption does not exceed the
segment boundary. Second and independently, we derive the optimal consumption
under a CC tariff under the expectation that the cost cap is met (FR segment), again
constrained on the condition that the optimal consumption does not exceed the
segment boundary. Hence, analogous to (10), the candidates for the optimal
consumption level under the CC tariff (i.e., the optimal consumption for each tariff
segment) are given by









where n^ denotes the consumption level that corresponds to the cost cap boundary,
i.e.,
n^ ¼ cCC=pCC: ð13Þ
Notice, that for any p [ 0; it follows that nPU\n

FR: Thus, at most one of the
consumption candidates can exceed bounds and admit the corner solution of n^:
Furthermore, it can be shown that whenever a consumption candidate admits a
corner solution, then the other consumption candidate is optimal. The corresponding
proof is available in Appendix 1. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can
restrict our attention to the case where neither consumption candidate admits a
corner solution. Of course, a rational consumer would choose the consumption
candidate that yields the higher consumer surplus. The corresponding threshold b1
is derived as follows:












1 ; n1CC is realized, otherwise n2CC: Consequently, the consumer surplus
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However, because pCC [ pPU (i.e., the marginal price is higher under the CC tariff
than under the alternative PU tariff), it follows that uCCðn1CCÞ\uPUðnPUÞ (i.e., the
consumer’s utility under the PU segment of the CC cap tariff is lower than under the
alternative PU tariff):
uCCðn2CCÞ ¼ uCC b1
2b2
 




b1  pPUð Þ2
4b2
ð17Þ
Likewise, because cCC [ fFR (i.e., the maximum billing amount under FR
segment of the CC tariff is higher than under the alternative FR tariff), it follows
that uCCðn2CCÞ\uFRðnFRÞ (i.e., the consumer’s utility under the FR segment of the
CC cap tariff is lower than under the alternative FR tariff):













Thus, irrespective of which consumption candidate is optimal under a CC tariff,
both are consumer surplus dominated by the optimal consumption plans under either
the FR tariff or the PU tariff.
Proposition 1 (CC choice under certainty) A rational consumer would never
choose a cost cap tariff over a flat rate or pay-per-use tariff if he has certainty about
his preferences.
4 Tariff consumption under uncertainty
In the following, we relax the assumption that the preferences are known with
certainty and assume that b1 is a realization of the random variable B1 that is
distributed according to the probability density function fB1ðb1Þ and the corre-
sponding cumulative distribution function FB1ðb1Þ: As discussed above, we assume
uncertainty in preferences ex-ante (see Hayes 1987; Kridel et al. 1993), which also
has an effect on optimal tariff choice. The only assumptions that are made about FB1
are that (1) FB1ðpCCÞ ¼ 0; which ensures a positive consumption level for all b1
under all tariffs and (2) that 0\FB1ðb1 Þ\1; which ensures that both consumption
candidates of the CC tariff, n1CC and n2CC; are chosen with positive probability.
Otherwise, the same logic as under certainty would apply and the CC tariff would
never be chosen by a rational consumer.
Under an FR and a PU tariff, it is easy to see that every realization b1 of the random
variable B1 directly determines the optimal consumption level according to Eq.(10).
Thus, under these two tariffs, the optimal consumption level is derived by a linear
transformation of the random variable B1: Consequently, the optimal consumption
levels, denoted by NPU and NFR; respectively, are distributed according to
Business Research (2014) 7:161–190 169
123





¼ FB1ð2b2n þ pPUÞ;
ð19Þ
FNFRðnÞ ¼ FB1ð2b2nÞ: ð20Þ
However, under a CC tariff the distribution of B1 does not linearly transform into
the distribution of the optimal consumption levels. To see this, recall from Eq.(15)
that given the realization b1 of the random variable B1; the consumer will consume
n1CC if b1\b

1 and n2CC; otherwise. Thus, at b1 ¼ b1 ; the consumer is indifferent




under the PU segment of the CC tariff, and




under the FR segment of the CC tariff. However, since
n1CC\n2CC for any b1; p [ 0, it follows that there exists a discontinuity in optimal










is never optimal. Notice that by substituting (14) into (21), we can derive
D ¼ n^  pCC
4b2




which shows that the non-consumption interval is evenly spaced around the cost cap
n^ and has a width of
d ¼ pCC=2b2: ð23Þ
This is also demonstrated by Fig. 1. The kink in the cost curve induces the consumer
to avoid any consumption around the cost cap level. Intuitively, just below the cost
cap level, the consumer would rather use the CC tariff like a flat rate because the
negative effect of slightly higher costs is over-compensated by the positive effect of
a much higher consumption level.
Consequently, the distribution of the optimal consumption levels under a cost cap
tariff, denoted by FNCC ; has zero mass in the interval D and can be written as
follows:
FNCCðnÞ ¼
FB1ð2b2n þ pCCÞ; if n n^  pCC4b2
FB1ð2b2n^ þ pCC2 Þ; if n^  pCC4b2 \n n^ þ
pCC
4b2




Proposition 2 (CC consumption) A rational consumer of a cost cap tariff will
never (expect to) consume exactly at the level at which the cost cap becomes
binding.
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5 Tariff choice under uncertainty
5.1 General case
We now investigate the tariff choice of a rational consumer under uncertainty. The
representative consumer is considered to be risk-neutral and, thus, he will choose
the tariff that maximizes expected consumer surplus. Note that a risk averse
consumer is more likely to choose a cost cap tariff. Hence, we study tariff choice
under the more conservative restriction of a risk-neutral consumer. From Eq. (11),
which describe the consumer surplus under a pay-per-use and flat rate tariff given
b1; and Eq. (16), which describes the consumer surplus under a cost cap tariff, it


































We can then write the difference in expected consumer surplus between a CC
tariff and an FR tariff as follows (see Appendix 5 for details):
Fig. 1 Cost curve of a cost cap
tariff (solid) and optimal
indifference curve (dashed)
corresponding to preference
parameter b1 : The consumer is
indifferent between consuming
below or above the cost cap
level, but will never consume in
the interval D around the cost
cap level
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where FB1ðb1 Þ is the probability that B1  b1 and E½B1jB1  b1  is the expected
value of B1 under the constraint that B1  b1 : Using cCC ¼ pCC=4b2ð2b1  pCCÞ
from Eq. (14), we can derive (see Appendix 5):












Equation (29) demonstrates that the CC tariff may yield a higher expected consumer
surplus than the FR tariff (1) if the cost cap cCC is not much larger than the flat rate
price bFR and (2) if low values of b1; i.e., b1\b

1 ; are realized with a sufficiently
high probability. The first condition ensures that the first, negative summand of
Eq. (29) is not too small, whereas the second condition ensures that the second,
positive summand is rather large.
Likewise, the difference between the expected consumer surplus of a CC tariff
and a PU tariff can be written as (see Appendix 5 for details):
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where 1  FB1ðb1 Þ is the probability that B1  b1 and E½B1jB1  b1  is the
expected value of B1 under the constraint that B1  b1 :
Again, replacing cCC ¼ pCC=4b2ð2b1  pCCÞ yields (see Appendix 5):

















E½uCC  E½uPU ¼ 1
4b2











where E½B1 is the expected value of B1 and E^ is a degenerate case of the expected
value of B1; where E½B1jB1  b1  ¼ b1 : Of course, generally, it holds that
E½B1jB1  b1   b1 : Thus, it can be concluded that E^E½B1:
Equation (32) reveals that the expected consumer surplus of a CC tariff may
exceed that of a PU tariff if (1) the marginal price of the CC tariff, pCC; is not much
larger than the marginal price of the PU tariff, pPU and (2) if high values of b1; i.e.,
b1 [ b

1 are sufficiently likely. Again, the first condition ensures that the first,
negative summand of Eq. (32) is not too small, whereas the second condition
ensures that the second, positive summand is rather large because E½B1 	 E^:
Notice that in order for the CC tariff to dominate both the FR and the PU tariff,
the consumer must face a sufficiently high probability for low and high values of b1:
Evidently, the CC tariff must additionally be reasonably priced in comparison to the
FR and PU tariff.
5.2 Example
To exemplify the impact of the probability distribution and the pricing of the CC
tariff on the choice of CC tariffs, consider the following uniform probability density
function of B1 :
fB1ðb1Þ ¼
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It is characterized by the two parameters offset and range which characterize the
expected level of the preference parameter b1; i.e., E½B1; and the level of uncer-
tainty about b1; respectively.
Figure 2 shows the optimal tariff choice of a risk-neutral consumer for different
values of offset and range. In line with Proposition 1, the CC tariff is never optimal if
the level of uncertainty is too low. In this case and depending on the offset of the
preference parameter, i.e., whether the consumer is a ‘light’ or ‘heavy’ user, the FR
or PU tariff is chosen, respectively. In reverse, the CC tariff is optimal in a region that
is characterized by an intermediate offset level and a large range. Intuitively, this
means that the CC tariff is optimal when a consumer has a high uncertainty about his
demand, with both a high probability that the demand will be low and a high
probability that the demand will be high. The corresponding profits of a provider who
offers a choice of all three tariffs are illustrated in Fig. 3. Notably, offering a cost cap
tariff over a pay-per-use tariff increases both consumer’s expected utility as well as
provider’s profits when the level of uncertainty is rather large. To see this, notice in
Fig. 3 that in this case the cost cap tariff is preferred by consumers and that expected
profits jump to a higher level compared to the expected profit under a pay-per-use
tariff. In Appendix 3, we also discuss the possibility of a provider to offer a single
tariff on the market and thus optimize his profits by limiting consumer’s choice.
Figure 4 additionally demonstrates the impact of the pricing of the CC tariff on
tariff choice. More precisely, the figure shows the indifference hyperplanes between
the different tariff options depending on the pricing ratios of the tariffs
ðpCC=pPU; cCC=bFRÞ and the consumer’s preference level (offset). It can be seen
that the PU and FR tariff are chosen over the CC tariff if the latter is priced too high,






























Fig. 2 Expected utility under optimal tariff choice for different preference levels (offset) and uncertainty
levels (range). The figure is derived for the values pPU ¼ 0:10; pCC ¼ 0:12; cCC ¼ 45; bFR ¼ 40;
b2 ¼ 0:001
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choice between the FR and the PU tariff is independent of the pricing of the CC
tariff, of course, and depends only on the expected level of demand (offset).
To conclude, the example demonstrates that CC tariffs may indeed present an
optimal tariff choice for a rational and risk-neutral consumer under certain
parameter conditions. In particular, these depend on a consumer’s level of
uncertainty about his preferences, which, by Eqs. (19) and (24), directly translates
into demand uncertainty.
Proposition 3 (Choice of CC tariffs under uncertainty) A (reasonably priced) cost
cap tariff may be chosen over a flat rate and a pay-per-use tariff by a risk-neutral
consumer in the presence of a sufficiently high demand uncertainty.
6 Empirical evaluation
In the following, an empirical evaluation is presented to demonstrate the
applicability of the previously developed consumer surplus model. To this end,
the consumer surplus model is evaluated based on survey data. We contracted with a
professional marketing research agency to conduct a survey online with a sample
that is representative of the population of German mobile telephony users. A total of
122 respondents completed the survey, which consisted of two parts.
In the first part, respondents had to imagine that they use a PU tariff for mobile
telephony and that this is the only tariff type available to them. In a repeated open-
ended question design (Miller et al. 2011; Schulze et al. 2005), the respondents had






























Fig. 3 Corresponding provider’s expected profits depending on optimal tariff choice for different
preference levels (offset) and uncertainty levels (range). The figure is derived for the values
pPU ¼ 0:10; pCC ¼ 0:12; cCC ¼ 45; bFR ¼ 40; b2 ¼ 0:001
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PU tariff, for each of the following minute prices (in €/min) pPU ¼
f0:40; 0:20; 0:10; 0:05g: As will be described in detail below, the four consumption
tuples ðE½NPU; pPUÞ that are obtained in this part of the survey are used to estimate a
respondent’s individual preference parameters E½B1 and b2; which are then
employed to calibrate the individual consumer’s surplus function.
In the second part, respondents were presented six different mobile telephony
tariffs. Each tariff type (PU, CC, FR) occurred twice with two different price levels
(see Table 3). For each tariff, respondents had to estimate their minimum, average
and maximum monthly usage (nmin; navg; nmax in min). In addition, the attractiveness
of each tariff had to be rated on a seven-point interval scale (1 = very unattractive,
7 = very attractive). As will be described below, the consumption data that are
obtained in this part of the survey are used at first to estimate the individual level of
uncertainty (from the difference of nmin and nmax under the PU tariff), which,
together with the preference parameters obtained through the first part of the survey,
completes the calibration of the individual consumer’s surplus function. The


























Fig. 4 Optimal tariff choice for different preference levels (offset) and parameterizations of the cost cap
tariff in relation to the pay-per-use and flat rate tariff ðpCC=pPU and cCC=bFRÞ: The figure is derived for the
values pPU ¼ 0:10; bFR ¼ 40; b2 ¼ 0:001 and range ¼ 1
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the respondent’s stated average usage, navg; under a given tariff and (2) the
respondent’s tariff rating.
6.1 Calibration of the individual consumer surplus function
At first, the respondent’s individual consumer’s surplus function is estimated using
the data from the first part of the survey as well as the stated average maximum and
minimum usage under the PU tariff from the second part of the survey as follows: In
a similar fashion as Schulze et al. (2005), the data from the repeated open-ended
question design in the first part of the survey are used to estimate the individual
preference parameters E½B1 and b2: To this end, we utilize Eq. (10) which provides
that nPU ¼ b1pPU2b2 : Consequently, a consumer should expect to consume E½NPU






Then, using the four consumption price tuples E½NPU; pPUð Þ which the respondent
stated in the first part of the survey (i.e., the stated average usage E½NPU at minute
prices (in €/min) of pPU ¼ f0:40; 0:20; 0:10; 0:05gÞ, the following ordinary least
squared regression can be conducted for each individual:
E½NPU ¼ c0 þ c1 pPU þ ; ð35Þ
where c0 and c1 are the regression coefficients that are estimated and  is the error
term.
With the help of Eq. (34), the coefficients c0 and c1 can then be transformed into












Finally, to completely specify a respondent’s consumer surplus function, it is
necessary to derive the individual distribution of B1 in addition to E½B1: To this
end, as in (33), a uniform distribution of fB1ðb1Þ is assumed that is centered around
E½B1 (i.e., offset):
Table 3 Tariffs to be evaluated by respondents
PU CC FR
Base fee (b) 0 (0) € 0 (0) € 20 (25) €
Minute price (p) 0.10 (0.13) €/min 0.12 (0.15) €/min 0.00 (0.00) €/min
Cost cap (c) 0 (0) € 25 (30) € 0 (0) €
High price level in parentheses
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b1 
Uðb1min ¼ E½B1  range=2; b1max ¼ E½B1 þ range=2Þ ð38Þ
Thereby, the range of the distribution [see (33)] is determined by the minimum
ðb1minÞ and maximum ðb1maxÞ value of b1 :
range  b1max  b1min: ð39Þ
Solving Eq. (10) for b1 yields b1 ¼ 2b2n þ pPU: Consequently, range can be
computed from the stated minimum ðnminÞ and maximum ðnmaxÞ usage under the PU
tariff in the second part of the survey as follows:
range  b1max  b1min ¼ 2b2ðnmax  nminÞ: ð40Þ
This completes the individual estimation of a consumer’s surplus function. An
exemplary estimation of an individual consumer’s surplus function can be found in
the Appendix 2.
We then evaluate our model in two different ways. First, given the expected
usage under a given tariff (derived from the calibrated consumer’s surplus function)
is compared to the reported average usage under each given tariff. Second, the
expected consumer’s surplus (also derived from the calibrated consumer’s surplus
function) is used as a predictor for the reported tariff rating.
6.2 Evaluation of the usage prediction
Given the individual preference parameters (E½B1  offset;b2 and range) a
respondent’s expected usage is calculated according to Eqs. (10), (24) and (33)
for each of the six tariffs. Note that each consumer’s preference parameters were
derived independently of the reported average usage of the respective consumer,
i.e., navg: Thus, we use an OLS regression (Model 1a in Table 4) to study the
correlation of predicted and reported average usage, while controlling for the
different tariffs and price levels using dummy variables. To account for individual
differences in rating behavior, a fixed-effect estimation is considered, which allows
to have an individual intercept for each respondent, whereas the regression
coefficients are constrained to be the same across all respondents:
navg;i;t ¼ c0 þ c1E½Ni;t þ c3Dt;CC þ c4Dt;FR þ c5Dt;HighPrice þ fi þ i;t ð41Þ
Dt;CC : Dummy variable identifying a cost cap tariff
Dt;FR : Dummy variable identifying a flat rate tariff
Dt;HighPrice : Dummy variable identifying the price level (1 = high or 0 = low) of
each tariff
fi : Fixed-effect of subject i:
i;t : Error term
Furthermore, we use the median relative absolute error (MdRAE) (Armstrong
and Collopy 1992) to evaluate the forecasting applicability of our model. The
MdRAE is a measure based on relative errors. Thereby, the relative absolute error
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(RAE) states the relation of the prediction accuracy of our model compared to a
simple mean forecasting model. It is calculated by the absolute difference between
the forecast of our model and the actual stated usage for each respondent, divided by
the absolute difference of a simple forecasting model, which predicts the stated





In contrast to measures based on percentage errors, such as the mean absolute
percentage error (MAPE), relative errors do not suffer from skewed distributions
when the data include small counts (Hyndman and Koehler 2006). Nevertheless, for
completeness we state that our model exhibits an MAPE of 0.886, which outper-
forms a simple mean forecasting model with an MAPE of 3.974. However, as our
data include small counts, we use the MdRAE as a relative error, which is less
sensitive against outliers. Thereby, the MdRAE is the median of all respondents’
relative absolute errors in our data set:
MdRAE ¼ medianðRAEiÞ ð43Þ
Our data set exhibits an MdRAE of 0.303, which states that half of our model’s
predictions have an error, which is a third or less compared to the error of the naive
model. Thus, we can conclude that our model has an improved forecast applicability
compared to a naive approach (Hyndman and Koehler 2006).
Furthermore, the coefficient in our regression in Table 4 is significant and with
0.901 close to one, indicating a good prediction quality (Iyengar et al. 2008, p.201).
However, the theoretical model has a slight tendency to overestimate the reported
usage. This is particularly true for the reported usage under the tariffs with a high
price level. Moreover, we find that respondents tend to overestimate their usage
under an FR tariff. This so-called overestimation effect is well known from previous
research (see, e.g., Nunes 2000). Finally, the regression model explains 80.6 % of
the total variance, indicating a good model fit.
6.3 Evaluation of consumer surplus prediction
Given the individual preference parameters, the consumer’s surplus for each tariff is
predicted according to Eqs. (25), (26) and (27). Note that the expected consumer’s surplus
takes into account tariff pricing, as well as the consumer’s preferences and uncertainty. A
respondent’s expected consumer surplus under a given tariff is then regressed on his rating
for this tariff, using the same type of regression model and controls as in (41):
ratingi;t ¼ c0 þ c2E½ui;t þ c3Dt;CC þ c4Dt;FR þ c5Dt;HighPrice þ fi þ i;t ð44Þ
Model 2a in Table 4 shows that there exists a significant and positive relationship
between the expected consumer’s surplus derived from the theoretical model and a
respondent’s tariff rating. Moreover, a significant portion of the total variance can
be explained, which indicates a good model fit. Furthermore, we find a significant
tariff bias. In comparison to the PU tariff, the CC tariff is assigned a 0.381 higher
Business Research (2014) 7:161–190 179
123
rating score, everything else equal. By far the largest bias is found for the FR tariff,
however. This finding is in line with earlier research on tariff bias (see, e.g.,
Lambrecht and Skiera 2006).
6.4 Robustness of prediction
To additionally control for random coefficients with respect to expected usage, we
report the results of a mixed-effects regression model (Models 1b and 2b), which
also controls for potential dependence of observations nested within one subject:
navg;i;t ¼ c0 þ ðc1 þ c1iÞE½Ni;t þ c3Dt;CC þ c4Dt;FR þ c5Dt;HighPrice þ fi þ i;t ð45Þ
ratingi;t ¼ c0 þ ðc2 þ c2iÞE½ui;t þ c3Dt;CC þ c4Dt;FR þ c5Dt;HighPrice þ fi þ i;t
ð46Þ
fi; ci1 and ci2 are random effects that are common to observations from the same
subject i: The random effects in these models are assumed to be independently
normally distributed with mean zero and with a variance estimated through our
regression. As can be seen from Table 4, the results are qualitatively the same as for
the fixed effects model. However, note that the estimation of a random effects
model may introduce a significant bias in the estimation (cf. Kennedy 2008, S.285),
for which reason the fixed effects model is preferred.
Table 4 Fixed and mixed-effects OLS regressions of model predictions on reported values
Fixed-effects OLS regression Mixed-effects OLS regression
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b)
Average usage Tariff rating Average usage Tariff rating






































Observations 6 9 121 6 9 121 6 9 121 6 9 121
# of independent variables 125 125 245 245
df 601 601 481 481
R2 0.806 0.536 0.763 0.265
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p \ 0.01, *** p \ 0.001
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7 Conclusions
This paper has developed a consumer surplus model under cost cap tariffs by which
the optimal consumption and choice under this new tariff type can be determined.
Under a reasonable set of assumptions, we find that cost cap tariffs are only an
optimal tariff choice for those consumers that face considerable uncertainty about
their future demand, such that both relatively low and relatively high consumption
levels are considered feasible. In this case, cost cap tariffs provide an insurance
against extraordinary high costs (like a flat rate), but also cost flexibility in case of
low demand (like a pay-per-use tariff). Therefore, consumers are willing to accept a
higher marginal price compared to a pay-per-use tariff as well as a cost cap which is
priced above the fixed fee of a flat rate. It was demonstrated that the model is useful
for predicting the actual tariff usage and rating. The proposed model may, therefore,
serve as a benchmark for future empirical research.
However, some limitations apply. The present model merely considers the
rational choice of a risk-neutral consumer. However, our empirical results suggest
that the rational tariff choice is systematically biased, e.g., due the above-mentioned
insurance effect (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006), the flexibility effect (Kra¨mer and
Wiewiorra 2012), the overestimation effect (Nunes 2000), or brand effects
(Schlereth and Skiera 2012). The detailed empirical investigation of the extent of
a bias for cost cap tariffs, in particular, in relation to the well-known flat rate bias,
therefore, seems to be a fruitful avenue for future research. Furthermore, for
expositional clarity, our consumer surplus model assumes a quadratic functional
form, as in Lambrecht et al. (2007) and Iyengar et al. (2008). However, alternative
functions might be more appropriate to describe consumer surplus as discussed by
Skiera (1999) and Albers and Skiera (2006). Thus, future work should address the
implications and suitability of alternative modeling approaches.
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Appendix 1: Proof of lemma
Lemma Whenever one of the consumption candidates from Eq. (12) for the
optimal consumption level under the CC tariff admits a corner solution, n^; then the
other consumption candidate is optimal.
Proof Let n^1CC ¼ b1pCC2b2 and n^2CC ¼
b1
2b2
denote the interior solution of the two
optimal consumption candidates under a CC tariff. First, notice, that for any p [ 0;
it follows that n^1CC\n^2CC: Thus, at most one of the consumption candidates can
admit the corner solution of n^: Next, we show that n^ ¼ cCC=pCC is the optimal
consumption within one tariff segment if the interior solution exceeds bounds.
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Case 1: n1CC admits the corner solution
This means that
n^1CC [ n^ , b1  pCC
2b2
[ n^ , b1  pCC  2b2n^ [ 0: ð47Þ
Now, we show that a consumer’s surplus is increasing in n for all feasible n 2 ½0; n^ :
8n 2 ½0; n^ : d
dn
uCC ¼ b1  2b2n b1  pCC  2b2n^ [ 0 ð48Þ
Thus, in this case, the optimal feasible consumption level is n^:




\n^ , b1  2b2n^\0: ð49Þ
Now, we show that a consumer’s surplus is decreasing in n for all feasible
n 2 ½n^;1Þ :
8n 2 ½n^;1Þ : d
dn
uCC ¼ b1  2b2n b1  2b2n^\0 ð50Þ
Thus, in this case, the optimal feasible consumption level is n^:
Finally, we proof the claim by showing that the corner solution, n^; of any one
tariff segment is utility dominated by the feasible interior solution (n^1CC or n^2CCÞ of
the other tariff segment. This means that (1) if n2CC ¼ n^ ) uCCðn1CCÞ uCCðn2CCÞ
and (2) if n1CC ¼ n^ ) uCCðn1CCÞ uCCðn2CCÞ:
n1CC ¼ n^ : 8n 2 ½0; n^ : uCCðnÞ uCCðn^Þ uCCðn2CCÞ ð51Þ
n2CC ¼ n^ : 8n 2 ½n^;1Þ : uCCðnÞ uCCðn^Þ uCCðn1CCÞ ð52Þ
Recall that only one of the two cases can occur. This proofs the lemma.
Appendix 2: Exemplary estimation of an individual consumer’s surplus
function
The following example illustrates the calculation of E½b1; b2 and range based on
data of an actual respondent.
Question Part I: Please assume that you have to use a pay-per-use tariff and
there is no alternative tariff option. Costs accrue for every minute on the phone
according to the minute price. This tariff does not include a fixed fee, an allowance
or a cost cap. Please state how many minutes you would be on the phone with the
given minute prices (outgoing calls only):
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Minute price 0.40 €/min 0.20 €/min 0.10 €/min 0.05 €/min
Usage 0 40 60 80
Question Part II: Please state your minimal, average and maximum number of
minutes you would be on the phone under the following tariffs (outgoing calls only):
Pay-per-use Cost cap Flat rate
Fixed fee 0 € 0 € 20 €
Minute price 0.10 €/min 0.12 €/min 0 €/min
Cost cap None 25 € None
Minimal usage in min 60 50 120
Average usage in min 80 60 200
Maximum usage in min 120 90 300
Calculation: Based on the stated four consumption tuples ðE½NPU; pPUÞ from
Question Part I, an OLS regression according to (35) is conducted, which provides
the following results (Table 5):




¼ 219:130 , b2 ¼
1




¼ 86:097 , E½B1 ¼ 86:097  2b2 ¼ 0:390 ð54Þ
Afterwards, the minimum ðnminÞ and maximum ðnmaxÞ stated usage under a pay-
per-use tariff from Question Part II can be used to calculate the range of the
assumed uniform distribution according to (40), which provides range ¼ 2 
0:002  ð120  60Þ ¼ 0:240 and a uniform distribution of b1 
Uð0:390 
0:240=2; 0:390þ 0:240=2Þ:




** p \ 0.01, *** p \ 0.001
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Appendix 3: Provider’s profit under cost cap tariffs
Figure 5 shows the optimal tariff offer of a monopolist, who maximizes his profit.
Note that the individual rationality constraint is not considered in this example. As
expected the optimal tariff offer is contrary to the optimal tariff choice of a
consumer and it is only profitable for a monopolist to offer a CC tariff if consumers
exhibit a rather high offset, i.e., is a ‘heavy’ user, and exhibit a low uncertainty in
his demand.
Appendix 4: Consumer’s indifference curves
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between consumer’s uncertainty and the
pricing of the CC tariff ðpCCÞ. As expected, an increase in pCC requires an increase
in consumer’s uncertainty so that a CC tariff is still an optimal choice over a PU/FR
tariff.
Appendix 5: Calculations: tariff choice under uncertainty
We start by writing the difference between the expected consumer surplus of a CC
tariff (25) and an FR tariff (26):
0.8
0.9



















Fig. 5 Optimal provider’s profit for different preference levels (offset) and uncertainty levels (offset).
The figure is derived for the values pPU ¼ 0:10; pCC ¼ 0:12; cCC ¼ 45; bFR ¼ 40; b2 ¼ 0:001





























Now, we resolve the quadratic equations and dissolve the terms:





















cost cap pay– per– use






















cost cap flat rate
Fig. 6 Consumer’s indifference curve for different marginal price levels of the CC tariff ðpCCÞ and
uncertainty levels (offset). The figures are derived for the values pPU ¼ 0:10; cCC ¼ 45;
bFR ¼ 40;b2 ¼ 0:001; offset ¼ 0:800





































































After factoring out the constant terms, we receive Eq. (28). Note that consolidating
terms 1 and 4 will result in the first term of Eq. (28):







































After integrating, this results in:





FB1ðb1 ÞE½B1jB1  b1  þ
p2CC
4b2
FB1ðb1 Þ  cCC 1  FB1ðb1 Þ
 þ bFR
ð58Þ
Using cCC ¼ pCC=4b2ð2b1  pCCÞ from Eq. (14) leads to:
E½uCC  E½uFR
¼ bFR  cCC þ FB1ðb1 Þ
pCC
4b2




and thus to Eq. (29):
E½uCC  E½uFR











Next, we consider the difference between the expected consumer surplus of a CC
tariff (25) and a PU tariff (27):
E½uCC  E½uPU ¼
Zb1
0
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We can now factor out 1
4b2
and receive Eq. (30):






































E½uCC  E½uPU ¼ 1
4b2
p2CC FB1ðb1 Þ  2ðpCC  pPUÞ FB1ðb1 Þ E½B1jB1  b1 

 4b2 cCC ð1  FB1ðb1 ÞÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
term 3
þ2pPUð1  FB1ðb1 ÞÞ E½B1jB1  b1   p2PU

ð63Þ
We use cCC ¼ pCC=4b2ð2b1  pCCÞ to rewrite term 3:
 4b2 cCC ð1  FB1ðb1 ÞÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
term 3
¼ 2pCCb1 ð1  FB1ðb1 ÞÞ þ p2CC ð1  FB1ðb1 ÞÞ
ð64Þ
Herewith, by stating that E^ is a degenerated case of the expected value of B1 (E½B1),
where E½B1jB1  b1  ¼ b1 we receive:
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We factor out pCC  pPU and, therefore, have to add the correction term
2 E½B1 pCC  E^ pPU
 
: Of course, generally, it holds that E½B1jB1  b1   b1 :
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